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IN FEDERAL AGENCY ISSUES1
DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
DURING 2001
I.  IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY IN 2001
A.  Introduction
The directives pertinent to the implementation of domestic open market operations issued by the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) instruct the Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY) to foster conditions in the market for reserves consistent with maintaining the Federal funds rate
at an average around a specified rate.
   This indicated rate is commonly referred to as the Federal funds rate
target.  The Desk arranges open market operations to target the funds rate, while at the same time achieving
certain other objectives that may affect the structure of the Federal Reserve balance sheet.
This report reviews the conduct of open market operations in 2001.  It begins with a description of the
operating procedures that are used to control the funds rate and a summary of the key new developments in
the policy implementation framework.  The demand for balances at the Federal Reserve and the behavior of
autonomous factors outside the control of the Desk that affect the supply of these balances are described in
the following sections.  Next, the different domestic financial assets held by the Federal Reserve, and the
various types of open market operations used to adjust them, are reviewed.   The behavior of the Federal
funds rate in 2001 and use of the discount window are discussed in the following section.  The conduct of
open market operations in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on
September 11 is reviewed in the final section.
B.  Overview of Operating Procedures to Control the Federal Funds Rate
The FOMC lowered the Federal funds rate target on eleven different occasions during 2001, reducing it by
a cumulative 4 ¾ percentage points to end the year at a level of 1 ¾ percent (Table 1).  Three of these rate
changes were made between regularly scheduled FOMC meetings.  Associated with each FOMC policy
move, the Board of Governors approved an equal sized reduction in the basic discount rate, which
preserved a 50 basis point spread of the target funds rate over the discount rate.
To target the Federal funds rate, the Desk uses open market operations to align the supply of balances held
by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve—or Fed balances—with banks’ demand for holding
balances at the target rate.  Each morning, the Desk considers whether open market operations are needed
based on estimates of the supply of and demand for balances, taking account of possible forecast errors and
minimal levels of aggregate Fed balances that in practice are needed to facilitate settlement of wholesale
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financial payments by banks.  When the funds rate is already near its target, the Desk aims to supply a level
of balances in line with its best estimate of demand.  And when the funds rate deviates from the target, the
Desk may adjust the level of Fed balances it aims to supply accordingly, to nudge the rate in the
appropriate direction.  Operations designed to alter the supply of Fed balances that same day, most
commonly of a short-term temporary nature, are typically arranged around 9:30 am Eastern Time each
morning, shortly after a complete set of estimates is available.  Open market operations that are designed
primarily to meet other objectives that influence the size or composition of the Fed’s balance sheet can
generally be arranged at other times of the day, but their use must be co-ordinated with those operations
geared towards achieving a particular level of Fed balances on each day.
The average level of balances banks demand over two-week reserve maintenance periods is in large
measure determined by certain requirements to hold balances, with only a small level of additional, or
excess, balances typically demanded.  Levels of requirements and period-average demands for excess are
relatively insensitive to changes in the target level of the Federal funds rate or only respond with some lag.
The ability of depository institutions to average their holdings of balances over the days within a
maintenance period to meet their requirements gives them considerable leeway in managing their accounts
from day to day.  This flexibility limits the volatility in rates that can develop when the Desk misestimates
either the supply of or demand for balances.  Nonetheless, the funds rate will firm if the level of balances
falls so low that some banks have difficulty finding sufficient funds to cover late-day deficits in their Fed
accounts; the rate will soften if balances are so high that some banks risk ending a period holding undesired
excess balances.
Table 1 
Changes in the Federal Funds Rate Specified in FOMC Directives 
 
      Target Federal      Associated 
Date of Change      Funds Rate (Percent)    Discount Rate (Percent) 
 5/16/2000        6 1/2        6  
 1/3/2001*        6        5 3/4; 5 1/2 on Jan. 4 
 1/31          5 1/2        5 
 3/20          5        4 1/2 
 4/18*          4 1/2        4 
 5/15          4        3 1/2 
 6/27          3 3/4        3 1/4 
 8/21          3 1/2        3 
 9/17*          3        2 1/2 
10/ 2          2 1/2        2 
11/ 6          2        1 1/2 
12/11          1 3/4        1 1/4 
* indicates policy change came between regularly scheduled meetings 
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C.  New Developments in 2001
There were no changes made to the FOMC’s Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations in 2001
(Appendix A).  At its January meeting, the FOMC once again extended temporarily, through its first
regularly scheduled meeting in 2002, its authorization for an expanded pool of eligible collateral for the
Desk’s repurchase agreements (RPs).  The principal effect was to continue the inclusion of pass-through
mortgage securities of the Government National Mortgage Association, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, and
of stripped securities of government agencies.  To implement this decision, the FOMC voted to extend
temporarily its suspension of several provisions of its “Guidelines for the Conduct of System Open Market
Operations in Federal Agency Issues,” which impose restrictions on transactions in Federal agency
securities (Appendix B).  Late in 2001, the Desk began to accept permanently the direct debt obligations of
the Student Loan Marketing Association as collateral on its repurchase transactions.
The Desk continued to operate under the guidelines first articulated in July 2000 that limit the permanent
holdings of single Treasury securities in the System Open Market Account (SOMA) to a given share of the
total outstanding amount.
1  These guidelines were prompted by the prospect of paydowns of marketable
debt associated with projected budget surpluses.  Meanwhile, Federal Reserve staff continued work begun
in 2000 on various studies of alternative assets the Federal Reserve might hold in its portfolio.
II.  BANKS’ DEMAND FOR FED BALANCES
The Desk aims to satisfy banks’ demand for holding Fed balances.  Total demand may be viewed as the
sum of two components: the portion needed to meet all requirements, and the portion held in excess of
requirements.
A.  Total Balance Requirements
A bank’s total balance requirement measures the level of balances it must hold at the Federal Reserve on
average over a two-week maintenance period to meet various regulatory obligations.  Total balance
requirements may be decomposed into two basic parts: reserve balance requirements (the level of reserve
requirements not met with applied vault cash) and clearing balance requirements.  In addition, various as-of
accounting adjustments may be applied that affect the actual level of Fed balances a bank must hold to
meet all these requirements.
2  Clearing balance requirements and, under lagged reserve accounting rules in
effect since August 1998, reserve balance requirements are determined prior to the start of each
                                                          
1 A detailed description of these guidelines and their motivation can be found at the following URL
address: www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/announce/2000/an000705.html.  They were also discussed in more
detail in last year’s annual report.
2 Clearing balance requirements, applied vault cash, and as-of adjustments affect the level of a bank’s total
balance requirements, and hence its demand for Fed balances.  In published data on reserves, these three
variables are treated as sources of reserve supply.4
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maintenance period, which facilitates estimation of the demand for Fed balances.  But as-of adjustments are
not all known when a period starts.  Most problematically, when large as-of adjustments are applied or
reported to the Desk on the settlement day, it affords the Desk little or no opportunity to adjust its estimates
of demand and its operations.
Decreases in short-term interest rates contributed to an increase in the underlying level of requirements,
particularly over the second half of the year (Chart 1).  Falling interest rates spurred growth in reservable
deposits over the year.
 3  As a consequence, aggregate reserve requirements rose above the level of banks’
applied vault cash, lifting the level of reserve balance requirements in a sustained fashion for the first time
since the wholesale adoption of sweep programs in 1995.  The reduction in interest rates also contributed to
a rise in clearing balance requirements, which registered their first significant increase in several years.
With the Fed using lower interest rates linked to the target funds rate to compute earning credits on clearing
balance requirements, banks that wish to have the maximum useful level of clearing balance requirements,
i.e., the level that generates just enough income credits to pay for all covered Fed services, had room to
                                                          
3 At the same time, there was little further growth in new sweep account programs, which in the past had
been a major source of decline in reserve requirements.  The estimated amount of demand deposits swept
by commercial banks through the introduction of new sweep programs during 2001 was about $40 billion,
somewhat down from recent years and well below the peak level.  A reduction in interest rates also reduces
the incentive banks have to expand sweeps to reduce the level of their requirements.5
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increase these requirements.  Over the twelve months ending in December, the underlying level of total
balance requirements rose about $5 billion, with somewhat more than half coming from the higher reserve
balance requirements.  This aggregate increase is not large when measured against the size of the Fed’s
balance sheet, but it is significant as a portion of total requirements.
Total balance requirements increased dramatically, but temporarily, in the two maintenance periods ended
October 17 and October 31, as a byproduct of disruptions following the September 11 attacks.  Reservable
deposits soared at a handful of key money center banks that were not able to transfer out funds on behalf of
their customers, and under lagged reserve accounting rules, these institutions faced much higher reserve
requirements in October.  These banks were able to restore their operational capabilities within days, and
the higher levels of reserve requirements were transitory.
B.  Excess Demands and Actual Excess Levels
Period average and daily levels of Fed balances are measured relative to the period average level of
requirements, to obtain measures of excess balances.  Demands for excess balances display fairly stable and
predictable patterns that are insensitive to the level of requirements, and the Desk must estimate these
excess demand patterns as part of estimating total demand for Fed balances.
4  The reasons for the severe
distortions to excess levels in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks are described in Section VI.
Over the last two months of the year, period-average levels of excess balances became more elevated, most
notably at smaller banking institutions where positive excess levels historically are concentrated (Chart 2).
To some degree, typical seasonal factors, the size of which can vary from year to year, may account for this
late-year increase.  But anecdotal evidence also suggests that the low absolute level to which interest rates
have dropped, thereby lowering the opportunity cost of holding excess balances, may have contributed to
the increase.  No evidence suggests that excess demand at larger banks has been increasing.
The daily intraperiod distribution of excess balances in 2001 continued to reflect banks’ strong preference
for concentrating their accumulation of Fed balances late in a maintenance period, after the second
weekend (Chart 3).
5  The degree of skew was more pronounced over this past year, with banks typically
holding somewhat lower levels of excess on most days ahead of the second weekend and larger excess
balances on the settlement day.  This greater concentration of excess accumulated on the final day was
encouraged by strongly held market expectations that the FOMC would adopt a lower target rate at its
                                                          
4 In this section, actual levels of excess balances on average over time are used as an approximation of
excess demand, even though a number of factors can cause actual excess levels to deviate from demand on
any day or for any period.
5 Median values are shown in this chart because they are less influenced than average values by the extreme
and unrepresentative deviations from normal levels of daily excess that arise from time to time.7
meetings during the year, most of which happened to fall on the second Tuesday of a maintenance period,
which pushed demands for balances towards the end of these periods.
III.  AUTONOMOUS FACTORS AFFECTING THE SUPPLY OF FED BALANCES
Autonomous factors are the assets and liabilities on the Federal Reserve balance sheet that are outside the
direct control of the Trading Desk.
6  They exclude the domestic financial assets controlled through open
market operations, discount window loans, and the deposit balances held by depository institutions at the
Fed.  Federal Reserve Note liabilities represent the largest single autonomous factor on the Fed’s balance
sheet by far, and for this reason the net value (assets minus liabilities) of all autonomous factors has a large
negative value; the net value of all other factors is close to zero.  Net movements in autonomous factors
affect the supply of Fed balances, and thereby create a need for open market operations to change the levels
of the various domestic financial assets on the Fed’s balance sheet to offset the effects of these factors.
7
The behavior of key factors in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks is discussed in Section VI.
Federal Reserve Notes
Federal Reserve Notes expanded by nearly $50 billion over the year, and were once again the largest source
of exogenous change on the Fed’s balance sheet (Chart 4).
8  F.R. Notes outstanding increased at an 8
percent pace over the twelve-month period ending in December, somewhat faster than their 6 3/4 percent
average annual rate of expansion over the preceding five year interval.  Lower interest rates likely spurred
demand for F.R. Notes in 2001 by reducing the economic cost of holding non-interest bearing notes.
Foreign demand also contributed to faster growth late in the year, compounding the seasonal increase in
F.R. Notes that occurred ahead of the holidays.  Unsettled economic conditions in Argentina seemed to
stimulate demand throughout much of the second half of the year.
Changes in Other Autonomous Factors
By comparison, the change in the net value of all other autonomous factors was small over the year.  Some
huge temporary changes in the foreign RP pool, Federal Reserve float, and foreign exchange holdings
followed the September 11 attacks, but most quickly returned to their pre-attack values.  The greatest
exception was the level of the foreign RP pool, which remained elevated throughout the fourth quarter of
                                                          
6 Autonomous factors are defined to include liabilities arising from matched sale-purchase agreements
arranged with foreign official institutions as part of the foreign RP pool.  The foreign RP pool is not
reported directly on the Fed’s balance sheet, but it is a factor that affects the supply of Fed balances.
7 In fact, the Desk retains a small degree of discretionary influence over the levels of some autonomous
factors, which may be used to shape the need for open market operations on some days.
8 The unusual decline in F.R. Notes over the twelve months ended in December 2000 was a byproduct of
the temporary bulge in F.R. Notes outstanding around the century date change.8
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the year.  Primarily as a consequence of these higher pool levels, the net value of autonomous factors other
than F.R. Notes fell a bit, by roughly $2 billion, over 2001.
Volatility and Predictability of Key Autonomous Factors
Excluding the roughly two week period following the September 11 attacks, the average of the daily
absolute changes in the net value of autonomous factors was down from the previous year, and same-day
predictability showed a slight improvement (Table 2).  Reduced volatility in currency in circulation, which
is used as a proxy for F.R. Notes in putting together daily forecasts of autonomous factors, mostly reflected
the impact of the huge swings in this factor around the century date change, which elevated volatility in
each of the two previous years.
9  Although the foreign RP pool was somewhat more volatile during 2001,
forecasting errors were down.
The Treasury’s Fed balance was much less volatile during 2001 than it was during 2000 and somewhat
more predictable.  Over the past few years, the ability of the staff to forecast the Treasury’s Fed balance on
a same-day basis has benefited from improved methods for collecting tax payment information early each
morning from around the financial system.  In 2001, predictability was also enhanced by a new cash
management technique adopted by the Treasury, called dynamic investing, that enabled it to move some
                                                          
9 Currency in circulation consists mostly of F.R. Notes, but it also includes about $30 billion of coins,
which are liabilities of the Treasury.  In absolute terms, changes in currency in circulation almost entirely
reflected movements in F.R. Notes.9
portion of unexpected flows arriving in its Fed account into its Treasury Tax and Loan (TT&L) accounts at
commercial banks on a same-day basis.  Throughout the year, TT&L capacity remained high relative to the
level of Treasury’s total cash balances.  This helped moderate volatility in the Treasury’s Fed balance by
reducing the number of days in which the Fed balance jumped because of insufficient TT&L capacity, and
it also may have improved indirectly the ability to forecast the Treasury’s Fed balance.
10
Table 2 
Daily Changes and Forecast Misses in Key Autonomous Factors 
Average and maximum of absolute values 
(millions of dollars) 
           1999                        2000                        2001                          2001 
                                                                                                         (excl. Sep.11-28)  Sep.11-28 
                 average     max.    average     max.    average     max.    average     max. 
Daily Change 
  Currency in circulation      918       5,379         970       8,087          851       2,696         919        2,537 
  Treasury balance      911    7,446       1,460     23,434         823       7,413       2,297        5,671 
  Foreign RP Pool        588       6,050         485       4,015          586       3,273      3,699        7,812 
  Float          712       6,217         887       9,677          894       4,923      6,888      32,099 
  Net value     1,709     17,653      2,058     23,896       1,828       7,918      7,028      30,770 
 
Daily Forecast Miss 
  Currency in circulation     233     1,361       238         1,648         210        1,043          502      1,135 
  Treasury balance     599        3,284       615         6,866         534        2,975          608       1,821 
  Foreign RP Pool       224     1,817       129           976           81        1,127        2,070      4,966 
  Float         394    4,274        392        2,742         447        2,084        2,312    10,398 
  Net value       811    5,443        787        7,218         762        3,503        2,568     12,723 
Note:  Forecast misses are based on New York staff estimates.   Currency in circulation is used as a proxy 
for F.R. Notes. 
 
IV.  DOMESTIC FINANCIAL ASSETS ON THE FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE SHEET &
       OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
The total value of all domestic financial assets (less any matched sale-purchase agreements arranged in the
market) held by the Federal Reserve mirrors the net level of autonomous factors and of Fed balances (Chart
5).
11  More substantively, the behavior of various autonomous factors and of sources of demand for Fed
balances will influence the choice of open market operations used to adjust the Fed’s domestic financial
portfolio.
12
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 In 2001, the Treasury’s general cash balance exceeded TT&L capacity, including Special Direct
Investment capacity, by more than the normal level of balances placed at the Fed (usually $5 billion) on
only 2 days, compared with 6 days in 2000.  The number of such occasions was 7 in 1999 and 16 in 1998.
11 In this report, the securities sold under temporary matched sale purchase agreements (MSPs) as part of
the foreign RP pool or in the market are considered financial assets held by the Fed, although they are not
officially recorded as such on the Fed’s balance sheet.  See footnote 6 for the treatment of the foreign RP
pool as an autonomous factor liability.  In keeping with this treatment, in this report MSPs arranged in the
market are considered a financial liability arranged at the discretion of the Desk.
12 Discount window activity is discussed in section V.10
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Note: Securities delivered under MSPs are considered part of the permanent SOMA.
A.  Permanent Holdings in the System Open Market Account and Outright Open Market Activity
The domestic SOMA includes all the domestic securities held on an outright basis.  By and large, changes
in the level of the SOMA have been used to accommodate net changes in autonomous factors and in
demands for Fed balances that are expected to endure.  For this reason, these holdings are often
characterized as being “permanent,” although their net value can be reduced whenever needed.  The par
value of the SOMA stood at $575 billion at year-end, consisting almost entirely of Treasury securities,
about $42 billion higher than one year earlier.
13  The expansion in the SOMA in 2001, as in many years,
roughly corresponded to the increase in F.R. Note liabilities.
14
The distribution of SOMA holdings by remaining maturity and across individual issues is intended to
achieve various objectives associated with having a liquid portfolio without distorting the yield curve or
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 The increase reflects almost entirely new purchases in excess of redemptions, but also includes a $529
million increase in the inflation compensation component of inflation-indexed securities, bringing its level
to $961 million.
14 By comparison, the slight increase in net balance sheet liabilities from movements in other autonomous
factors and the rise in total balance requirements added only modestly to any need for a “permanent”
increase in the value of financial assets in the Fed’s portfolio.11
impairing the liquidity of the market for individual Treasury securities.   In pursuit of these objectives, the
Desk continued to adhere to the per issue guideline limits on SOMA holdings of individual Treasury issues,
articulated in July 2000.  It also continued to limit SOMA purchases of newly issued Treasury securities, as
it has no particular portfolio need for some of the liquidity characteristics that can add to the value of these
issues in the market.
Auction Participation and Redemptions
Typically, any needed expansion of the SOMA is achieved by making outright purchases of Treasury
securities in the secondary market, which are then sustained by replacing maturing holdings with newly
issued debt at Treasury auctions.  At Treasury auctions of coupons and bills in 2001, the FRBNY continued
to place add-on bids for the SOMA equal to the lesser of (a) its maturing holdings on the issue date of a
new security or (b) the amount that would bring SOMA holdings as a percentage of the issue to the
percentage guideline limits.
15  There were no issues maturing on dates when newly auctioned Treasury
Inflation Indexed Securities (TIIS) settled.  In cases where maturing holdings were to be rolled into more
than one new issue of different maturities, the Desk allocated the maturing amount in such a way as to
leave the same gap, measured in percentage points, between the per-issue cap and the actual percentage
holding of each new issue.  A slightly different approach was taken for the weekly bill auctions after the
introduction of the new 28-day bill, because of the potential volatility in amounts of 28-day bills auctioned
from week to week.  The Desk determined the amount of maturing bills to be rolled over and its allocation
on the basis of the smallest 28-day bill auction size experienced to date, rather than the actual auction size.
Remaining within the per-issue percentage caps while the Treasury continued to cut back on auction sizes
through the first half of the year forced another $27 billion of redemptions of maturing Treasury holdings in
2001, roughly equal to the previous year’s total; this includes about $1.5 billion of maturing holdings that
were redeemed because of the cancellation of a 28-day bill auction on September 11.  Redemptions tapered
off over the year, largely as a consequence of the changed federal budget situation and Treasury issuance
patterns.  Also during the year, $120 million of holdings of Federal agency securities were called, which
left a mere $10 million of agency holdings in the SOMA at year-end.
Secondary Market Purchases and Operational Techniques
With redemptions again so large over the year as a whole and growth in F.R. Notes strong, the necessary
expansion of the SOMA required a record value of outright purchases of Treasury securities by the Trading
Desk, amounting to $68.5 billion (Chart 6).  There were no sales of securities.
                                                          
15 Foreign add-ons, which are not known at the time the Desk determines its level of participation at
auctions, were assumed to be zero in this calculation.12
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About $15 billion of bills were purchased, and bill holdings increased by a significant amount for the first
time in several years (Chart 7).  Altogether, the Desk purchased $8 billion of bills in the market in four
operations.  Another $7 billion were purchased directly from foreign central banks, in small daily
increments on days when sell orders from these accounts were available and consistent with SOMA
portfolio guidelines.
16
The Desk also purchased $53 billion of coupon securities in the market, arranging a record 64 coupon
operations.
17  These operations continued to be segmented into separate tranches across different portions
of the yield curve to facilitate rapid execution.  Given the frequent need for secondary market purchases,
the Desk sought to distribute its purchases evenly over time as much as possible and did not attempt to
concentrate operations in periods when F.R. Note growth was fastest.
The selection of specific issues in each operation was based on the relative attractiveness of propositions
and portfolio considerations.  In addition to remaining within the per-issue-guideline limits and avoiding
on-the-run issues, the Desk avoided purchases that would be expected to cause a sizable redemption on any
day in the foreseeable future, and it bought no issues in the secondary market that had less than four weeks
remaining to maturity.
General Characteristics of Domestic Permanent SOMA Holdings at Year-End
The average maturity of the entire SOMA portfolio of Treasury securities was 53.5 months at year-end, up
slightly from 52.9 months one year earlier.  The share of all outstanding marketable Treasury securities
held in the SOMA was 19 percent, about a percentage point higher than a year earlier.  The SOMA held 25
percent of all bills (compared to 31 percent a year ago), and 17 percent of all coupons including TIIS
(compared to 14 percent a year earlier).  At the end of the year, approximately $228 billion of marketable
Treasury securities remained purchasable under the Desk’s guidelines for percentage holdings—compared
with $260 billion at the end of the previous year.  The gross remaining purchasable amount was $183
billion if account is taken of the practices of avoiding purchases of recently issued debt, purchases that
would contribute to sizable redemptions, and purchases of issues that mature within four weeks.
                                                          
16 The Desk sets a $250 million limit on total daily purchases from foreign accounts, subject to review if
reserves needs or orders warrant an exception.
17 This total includes five TIIS operations, totaling $3.3 billion. On one day, two separate coupon
operations were arranged.14
B.  Temporary Holdings and Open Market Operations
Long Term Repurchase Agreements
Over the past two years, long-term RPs, defined as operations with an original maturity of more than fifteen
days, have been a standard asset in the Fed’s domestic financial portfolio.
18  Temporarily increasing the
total size of outstanding long-term RPs has proven to be an effective way of addressing significant
increases in the net value of autonomous factor liabilities or increases in demands for Fed balances that are
expected to last for a number of weeks or months, but not permanently.  Long-term RPs can also be
adjusted readily to accommodate an extended mismatch between changes in the permanent SOMA and in
levels of autonomous factors and total balance requirements.
During the year, the Desk adhered to the practice of arranging an RP with a 28-day maturity on the Monday
and/or Thursday of each week.
19  These operations are typically arranged early in the morning, before final
daily reserve estimates are available, as their use is not geared toward addressing daily volatility in
autonomous factors and excess demands.  In other respects, these RPs are operationally just like those for
short-term maturities.  Dealer participation at these long-term RPs has consistently been very strong,
measured by the size of propositions.
The sizes of the 28-day RPs arranged over the year ranged from $2 billion to $5 billion.  Over most of the
first half of 2001, their total outstanding value stood at $12 billion, which was also the lowest outstanding
total for the year (Chart 8).  In the third quarter, the Desk built up their underlying level modestly, but in
the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks the Desk allowed two long-term RPs to mature
without replacement, to simplify its market involvement at the time.  As reserve deficiencies deepened late
in the year, at first when requirements bulged in October and then as F.R. Notes began to grow from
seasonal factors, long-term RPs were gradually increased, peaking at a level of $31 billion in the year-end
maintenance period.
Short-term RPs and MSPs
Short-term temporary operations, RPs and matched sale-purchases (MSPs), are the primary tool used to
address day-to-day volatility in autonomous factors and in demands for Fed balances.  These operations
                                                          
18 The choice of any maturity to distinguish long-term from short-term RPs is somewhat arbitrary.  Fifteen
days had been the maximum allowable maturity under the FOMC’s Authorization for many years until
1998, and it approximates the length of a reserve maintenance period.  Fifteen days is designated to be the
longest “short-term” maturity because, as noted in this section, the RPs the Desk used that carried a fifteen
day maturity had a clear short-term operational focus.
19 This practice was first begun in March 2000.  In January 2002, the Desk began to arrange these 28-day
RPs just once per week, on each Thursday, adjusting the size of each operation to achieve the same desired
total outstanding amount.  This weekly schedule will continue to provide the desired flexibility to the
portfolio at even lower operational cost.15
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also are used to fill temporarily the gaps left by more enduring changes in autonomous factors and Fed
balance demands that are not immediately met by changes in the permanent SOMA or long-term RPs
outstanding.
Daily volatility in short-term temporary operations outstanding (RPs less MSPs), measured by the average
of absolute daily changes in short-term agreements outstanding, has been around $3 1/2 billion in each of
the past two years.  Daily levels of net short-term operations outstanding ranged from -$4 billion to +$81
billion; excluding the days immediately following the September 11 attacks, the peak was +$31 billion.  On
a period-average basis, short-term operations outstanding ranged from $4 billion to $38 billion; excluding
the two exceptionally high period-average levels that covered late-September, the period-average peak was
$14 billion.  For the year as a whole, short-term temporary operations outstanding averaged $10 billion.
The average was closer to $8 billion excluding the September 19 maintenance period, which was somewhat
above the $5 billion average outstanding level in 2000.
Volatility in autonomous factors and in demand for Fed balances requires the Desk to be prepared to
arrange these operations each day, and often an overlapping structure of short-term operations is
constructed.  By far, the most common operation was an overnight RP (which includes all RPs that cover16
just one business day), of which 133 were arranged in 2001 (Chart 9).  As usual, the Fed’s portfolio
continued to be structured in such a way as to keep reliance on MSPs relatively low.
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In general, propositions were sufficient to cover the intended size of the short-term operations the Desk
wished to arrange.  However, ahead of days on which propositions were expected to run low, the Desk
sometimes layered in term agreements of short duration to ensure this outcome.  For example, dealer
participation on overnight RPs was relatively low on quarter-end dates, when high excess needs usually
required a large amount of short-term RPs to be outstanding (Chart 10).  Propositions on RPs on FOMC
meeting dates in 2001 also tended to be low, as a byproduct of expected imminent rate cuts.  On these
dates, by the time the Desk was prepared to arrange its short-term operations, dealers had already met a
greater than normal share of their total overnight borrowing needs, in response to heightened demand from
their institutional customers.  These cash investors had greater amounts to invest on an overnight basis with
the dealers because the borrowers with whom they normally placed cash on a term basis were issuing less
term debt on days of expected rate cuts.
Also in 2001, the Desk arranged two short-term RPs, an overnight operation and a term agreement of up to
fifteen days, on seven different maintenance period settlement dates, usually out of concern that
propositions on the overnight RP alone might not be adequate to address all of the remaining period need.
Given banks’ usual preference for holding higher excess levels on settlement dates, which was even more
pronounced in 2001, the Desk sometimes faced a larger remaining add need on these days than it was
comfortable addressing with a single, overnight operation.  The term agreements arranged on these
occasions were used to help meet needs in the following maintenance period.
Collateral Distribution
The Desk solicited propositions across the entire pool of eligible collateral on all RPs arranged in 2001.
But with the exception of nine RPs arranged on the days immediately following the September 11 attacks,
all RPs were arranged as three separate simultaneous operations differentiated by type of collateral eligible.
In the first of these, only Treasury debt was accepted; in the second, direct federal agency obligations (in
addition to Treasury debt) were eligible; and, in the third, mortgage-backed agency debt was eligible (in
addition to the other two categories of debt).  For the purposes of this report, these separate operations are
counted as different tranches of a single RP.  In order to simplify the structure of its operations, for several
days after September 11 the Desk only arranged RPs with a single tranche, under which dealers had the
option to deliver Treasury, agency, or mortgage-backed collateral.  All RPs arranged in 2001 settled under
                                                          
20 One reason the Desk avoids heavy reliance on MSPs is that propositions on these operations in general
are low compared to RPs, reflecting dealers’ net borrowing needs.  Also, given the structure of the Fed’s
balance sheet, routine reliance on MSPs would require expanding the Fed’s holdings of financial assets
above the level that is needed to meet its net autonomous factor liabilities and demands for Fed balances.17
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the triparty agreements established with two clearing banks in 1999.  Under these agreements, dealers have
flexibility to choose, and to change from day to day, the specific securities they deliver within each tranche.
The distribution of accepted propositions across collateral categories on multi-tranche RPs was determined
by the relative attractiveness of rates in each tranche benchmarked against current market financing rates
for that class of collateral.  Distributions of collateral by tranche on outstanding RPs tend to be reasonably
stable, but they can be very volatile from one operation to the next.  In 2001, tranches in which mortgage-
backed securities were eligible tended to account for a somewhat smaller share of total outstanding RPs.
Their share on short-term RPs in 2001 was about the same as in the previous year, but only because of the
large, single-tranche RPs arranged in the aftermath of September 11 (Chart 11).
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V.  THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE AND DISCOUNT WINDOW CREDIT
A.  The Federal Funds Rate
Daily volatility in the Federal funds rate and deviations of effective rates from target in 2001 were slightly
higher than in the preceding year, but still to the low side of recent norms (Table 3).  Deviations of morning
funds rates from target, often a measure of market expectations for likely rate behavior later in the day,
                                                          
21 These tranches reflect options that dealers have for delivering different categories of collateral on
outstanding RPs where, for example, a dealer has the option to deliver Treasury debt on agency RPs but not
vice versa.19
continued to show the kinds of recurring patterns associated with certain calendar events seen in previous
years.  The deviations of the morning rate from target on high payment flow days and on Fridays were a
touch smaller than in past years.  However, morning premiums on maintenance period settlement days,
which had been common in the past but which had largely disappeared over the preceding couple of years,
were again evident in 2001, averaging around 6 basis points.  The higher levels of excess reserves that had
to be accumulated on the final day to meet requirements in 2001 may have contributed to funding anxieties
of bank reserve managers.
Table 3 
Federal Funds Rate Behaviors 
Medians and Averages of Daily Values 
(in basis points)                                                          
                                                                                               1998                1999                  2000               2001 
                        
Deviations of Effective Rate from Target 
   Median                                                                                    0                     -1                         1                   0 
   Average                                                                                   2                     -1                         2                  -1 
 
Absolute Deviations of Effective Rate from Target 
   Median                                                                                    8                      7                         4                    5 
   Average                                                                                 13                    11                         7                    9 
 
Intraday Standard Deviations          
   Median                                                                                  12                      9                         6                    7 
 
Medians of Morning Rates less Target Rate on: 
  High Payment Flow Days (excl. quarter-ends)                      25                    19                      19                   16 
  Fridays                                                                                    -6                     -6                       -6                   -3 
  Maintenance Period Settlement Days                                    13                      0                         0                    6 
B.  Discount Window Credit
Discount window credit makes up a relatively small portion of the total domestic financial assets held by
the Federal Reserve.  Much of this credit is seasonal borrowing, which behaviorally is more akin to an
autonomous factor in terms of its implications for open market operations (Chart 12).
22  Adjustment credit
is typically quite small, but the existence of the adjustment credit facility is an important part of the
monetary policy implementation framework.  It acts as a stabilizer, moderating the upward movements in
the Federal funds rate in the event a shortage of Fed balances leaves a bank overdrawn on its Fed account at
the end of any day or deficient in meeting its requirements on a maintenance period settlement day.  The
critical role of the adjustment credit facility during times of severe stress in financing markets is
highlighted by the discussion in the following section of its use immediately following the September 11
attacks.  For meeting more routine reserve shortfalls and payments difficulties, even levels of adjustment
borrowing that are small relative to the total supply of Fed balances can help alleviate the degree of upward
rate pressure that can develop in the market.
                                                          
22 There were no instances of extended credit borrowing at the discount window.20
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Large banks as a group borrowed an amount in excess of $500 million on eleven different days in 2001,
including three occasions coming in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks (Chart 13).   This
total is in line with the number of occasions banks borrowed at least that much in the preceding three years.
Large banks borrowed a somewhat smaller but still significant amount, in excess of $100 million, on
another ten occasions in 2001, but this number was somewhat below the frequency in most other recent
years.
VI.  THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY OPERATIONS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
This section presents an overview of the context and conduct of open market operations in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on Tuesday, September 11.
General Financing Market Conditions
Immediately following the attacks, many financial markets effectively ceased operations.  But with Fedwire
and other wholesale payments networks remaining open, securities dealers and banks faced a continuing
need to obtain funding for large pre-existing positions that they typically finance on an overnight basis.
Communications disruptions prevented many borrowers from having normal access to their investor base
for the first few days after September 11, even among those not directly affected by the attacks, and the
impaired ability of a major clearing bank to process funds and securities transfers for itself and on behalf of
its customers created additional uncertainties.  Banks and dealers, uncertain about their general cash
position or the availability of financing, tended to refrain from making cash outlays until later than normal
in the day.  In the Federal funds market, several of the major brokers ceased operations for a time, and
many large banks resorted to arranging trades directly with one another.  Although not fully back to normal
levels of operating efficiency, by Monday, September 17 the payments and communications infrastructure
most critical to the functioning of the financing market had recovered considerably, and participation levels
were much improved.
Behavior of Autonomous Factors
Levels of several of the autonomous factors on the Fed’s balance sheet were dramatically affected by some
of the responses to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks (Chart 14).  Over the three day interval
from September 12 to September 14 (Wednesday through Friday), net autonomous factor movements
increased the supply of Fed balances dramatically, and then net factor movements began to drain large
quantities.  The level of float in the banking system peaked at $47 billion on that Thursday as a result of the
temporary curtailment of air traffic nationwide.  Another $20 billion of Fed balances was created that day
when the ECB drew on a temporary foreign currency swap line that had just been established.  Meanwhile,
investments in the foreign RP pool jumped between $15 billion and $20 billion above prior levels, reducing
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something like normal levels by Monday, September 17, but persistent high levels of the pool began to
leave large underlying deficiencies.
Federal Reserve Monetary Operations, and the Level and Distribution of Fed Balances
On the morning of September 11, the Federal Reserve issued a public release stating “The Federal Reserve
System is open and operating.  The discount window is available to meet liquidity needs,” to encourage
banks to view the discount window as a source of liquidity.  September 11 fell in the middle of the
maintenance period ended September 19; for the remainder of that period, the Desk arranged only
overnight RPs for same-day settlement because of the high degree of volatility in the needed level of RPs
outstanding from one day to the next.
From Wednesday through the following Monday, the sizes of open market operations were aimed at
satisfying all the financing that dealers wished to arrange with the Desk, in order to mitigate to the extent
possible the disruptions to normal trading and settlement arrangements.
23  On these four days, all
propositions with rates at or above the prevailing target were accepted, which was the vast majority.
Dealers’ total demands for financing far surpassed any need to arrange operations simply to provide an
aggregate level of Fed balances that would help banks meet their requirements or their desired end-of-day
                                                          
23 The RP on September 12 was arranged from the Main Building.  Subsequent operations were arranged
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holdings of balances at the Fed.  To more effectively serve as a source of financing of last resort and to help
encourage dealers to continue to intermediate on behalf of some of their own customers, the Desk
operated relatively late in the day, after dealers had a good opportunity to assess their full financing needs
and to secure all available financing in the market.
The size of the overnight RPs peaked on Thursday and Friday, at $70 billion and $81 billion, respectively,
the same days that autonomous factors also added the most to the supply of Fed balances (Chart 15).
Before discount window borrowing, Fed balances both those days topped $110 billion, and, in general, Fed
balances before borrowing were extraordinarily elevated from Wednesday through Monday (Chart 16).
But even with such high levels of Fed balances, severe dislocations that interfered with their distribution in
the first few days after the attacks caused many banks to borrow at the discount window to cover overdraft
positions.  As a result, levels of adjustment borrowing soared to record levels on Tuesday and Wednesday.
By the final days of the maintenance period, after financing markets began to function more normally, the
Desk aimed its operations at maintaining a more traditional balance between the supply of and demand for
Fed balances, consistent with the Federal funds rate trading around the target level, lowered to 3 percent on
September 17.  With cumulative excess positions so high and with financing rates generally quite low,
reflecting the weight of these excess positions, the Desk was aiming to leave relatively low levels of Fed
balances in place each day.  The size of the RPs needed to provide even these relatively low levels of
balances remained large for a time, reflecting the impact of autonomous factors that were now reducing the
supply of Fed balances below normal levels.  As dealers increasingly were able to communicate with and
obtain financing from their usual customers, the Desk had to move up its operating time to ensure a
sufficient level of participation for the large RPs that were still needed, and it had to accept the vast
majority of propositions—even those offered at rates well below the new 3 percent target level—in order to
arrange RPs of sufficient size.
Even with the low levels of excess provided late in the maintenance period, the average level of excess
balances for the period ended September 19 was $38 billion.  This excess was highly concentrated at a
small number of institutions that accumulated high balances as a result of an inability to make payments or
to sell funds in the first days after the attacks, and it did not reflect any desire to hold huge excess balances.
In part to simplify the nature of our direct market involvement under exigent circumstances, from
September 11 through the remainder of the maintenance period underway, the Desk did not replace any of
its maturing long-term RPs, and it arranged no outright operations.  On the settlement day, the Desk
arranged three term RPs that settled on a forward basis on the first day of the following maintenance
period, totaling $23 billion, in order to reduce the level of intervention that would be needed in financing
markets in upcoming days.  Other changes were also made to simplify operations.  Instead of25
differentiating between collateral types, each RP was arranged as a single tranche where dealers had the
option to deliver any of our three categories of collateral.  Because some dealers lacked connectivity at
their contingency sites, the Desk operated in a semi-manual mode, inputting propositions for many dealers
(although our automated trade processing system continued to operate uninterrupted).  Because of the time
required to establish voice communications with dealers lacking electronic connections and the time needed
to receive bids by phone, the time between when an operation was first announced and when it was closed
was lengthened, and the Desk often pre-announced its time-frame for operating.
Financing Rate Behavior
From Tuesday, September 11, through most of Thursday, September 13, market participants in both the
government securities RP markets and in the Federal funds market simply priced their trades at the target
funds rate, a response to the attacks that likely helped maintain some order in these markets.  The high
levels of excess balances provided through the Desk’s RPs first began to weigh heavily on the funds rate
during late trading on Thursday and again on Friday, although through Monday, September 17 morning
rates generally reverted back to the target (Chart 17).  Thereafter, extremely low rates prevailed in the funds
and RP markets for several days, falling even below 1 percent.  These low rates in large measure reflected
misperceptions that the Desk was continuing to provide high levels of balances, a view reinforced by the
continuing large sizes of our RPs and widespread reports that were crediting the Desk with providing
abundant liquidity to the market.  Several episodes of rates being pushed higher in late-day trading, induced
by the relatively low levels of Fed balances the Desk was leaving in place, were needed to nullify these
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APPENDIX A:  AUTHORIZATION FOR DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
Open market operations were conducted under the Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations.
The Authorization in effect at the end of 2001 is reprinted below:
Authorization for Domestic Open Market Operations
1. The Federal Open Market Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, to the extent necessary to carry out the most recent domestic policy
directive adopted at a meeting of the Committee:
(a) To buy or sell U.S. Government securities, including securities of the
Federal Financing Bank, and securities that are direct obligations of,
or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the
United States in the open market, from or to securities dealers and
foreign and international accounts maintained at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, on a cash, regular, or deferred delivery basis, for
the System Open Market Account at market prices, and, for such
Account, to exchange maturing U.S. Government and Federal
agency securities with the Treasury or the individual agencies or to
allow them to mature without replacement; provided that the
aggregate amount of U.S. Government and Federal agency securities
held in such Account (including forward commitments) at the close
of business on the day of a meeting of the Committee at which
action is taken with respect to a domestic policy directive shall not
be increased or decreased by more than $12.0 billion during the
period commencing with the opening of business on the day
following such meeting and ending with the close of business on the
day of the next such meeting;
 (b) To buy U.S. Government securities, obligations that are direct
obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by,
any agency of the United States, from dealers for the account of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York under agreements for
repurchase of such securities or obligations in 65 business days or
less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly authorized by the
Committee, shall be determined by competitive bidding, after
applying reasonable limitations on the volume of agreements with
individual dealers; provided that in the event Government securities
or agency issues covered by any such agreement are not repurchased
by the dealer pursuant to the agreement or a renewal thereof, they
shall be sold in the market or transferred to the System Open Market
Account.
(c) To sell U.S. Government securities that are direct obligations of, or
fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, any agency of the
United States to dealers for System Open Market Account under
agreements for the resale by dealers of such securities or obligations
in 65 business days or less, at rates that, unless otherwise expressly
authorized by the Committee, shall be determined by competitive
bidding, after applying reasonable limitations on the volume of
agreements with individuals dealers.
2. In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, the Federal Open
Market Committee authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend on an
overnight basis U.S. Government securities held in the System Open Market Account
to dealers at rates that shall be determined by competitive bidding but that in no event27
shall be less than 1.0 percent per annum of the market value of the securities lent.  The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York shall apply reasonable limitations on the total
amount of a specific issue that may be auctioned and on the amount of securities that
each dealer may borrow. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York may reject bids
which could facilitate a dealer’s ability to control a single issue as determined solely
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
3.  In order to ensure the effective conduct of open market operations, while assisting in
the provision of short-term investments for foreign and international accounts
maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Open Market
Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (a) for
System Open Market Account, to sell U.S. Government securities to such foreign and
international accounts on the bases set forth in paragraph l(a) under agreements
providing for the resale by such accounts of those securities in 65 business days or less
on terms comparable to those available on such transactions in the market; and (b) for
New York Bank account, when appropriate, to undertake with dealers, subject to the
conditions imposed on purchases and sales of securities in paragraph 1(b), repurchase
agreements in U.S. Government and agency securities, and to arrange corresponding
sale and repurchase agreements between its own account and foreign and international
accounts maintained at the Bank.  Transactions undertaken with such accounts under
the provisions of this paragraph may provide for a service fee when appropriate.
4.  In the execution of the Committee’s decision regarding policy during any intermeeting
period, the Committee authorizes and directs the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
upon the instruction of the Chairman of the Committee, to adjust somewhat in
exceptional circumstances the degree of pressure on reserve positions and hence the
intended federal funds rate.  Any such adjustment shall be made in the context of the
Committee’s discussion and decision at its most recent meeting and the Committee’s
long-run objectives for price stability and sustainable economic growth, and shall be
based on economic, financial, and monetary developments during the intermeeting
period.  Consistent with Committee practice, the Chairman, if feasible, will consult
with the Committee before making any adjustment.28
APPENDIX B:  GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF SYSTEM OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS IN
FEDERAL AGENCY ISSUES
The FOMC has established specific guidelines for operations in agency securities to ensure that Federal
Reserve operations do not have undue market effects and do not serve to support individual issuers.
Provisions 3-6 of the Guidelines were first temporary suspended in August 1999, in order to expand the
types of agency securities the Desk could accept on its operations around the century date change.  This
suspension was extended in March 2000, in light of anticipated paydowns of federal debt, and it was
reaffirmed in January 2001 until the FOMC’s first meeting in 2002.
Guidelines for the Conduct of System Operations in Federal Agency Issues
1.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are an integral part of total System open market
operations designed to influence bank reserves, money market conditions, and monetary aggregates.
2.  System open market operations in Federal agency issues are not designed to support individual sectors
of the market or to channel funds into issues of particular agencies.
3.  System holdings of agency issues shall be modest relative to holdings of U.S. Government securities,
and the amount and timing of System transactions in agency issues shall be determined with due regard for
the desirability of avoiding undue market effects.
4.  Purchases will be limited to fully taxable issues, not eligible for purchase by the Federal Financing
Bank, for which there is an active secondary market.  Purchases will also be limited to issues outstanding in
amounts of $300 million or over in cases where the obligations have maturity of five years or less at the
time of issuance, and to issues outstanding in amounts of $200 million or over in cases where the securities
have a maturity of more than five years at the time of issuance.
5.  System holdings of any one issue at any one time will not exceed 30 percent of the amount of the issue
outstanding.  Aggregate holdings of the issues of any one agency will not exceed 15 per cent of the amount
of outstanding issues of that agency.
6.  All outright purchases, sales and holdings of agency issues will be for the System Open Market
Account.